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IS THERE A MORAL OBLIGATION FOR HEALTH CARE 
ORGANIZATIONS TO DEVELOP ROBUST ADVANCE CARE 
PLANNING PROGRAMS? 
THOMAS D. HARTER, PH.D.* 
ABSTRACT 
Advance care planning (ACP) has become an integral part of patient care 
because of its ability to help guide treatment decision making for individuals in 
need of medical care but who have lost the ability to communicate—
temporarily or permanently—due to illness or injury. Not all persons have the 
same treatment threshold; some persons value their lives above all else and 
will accept a high level of physical debility regardless of personal discomfort 
to stay alive. Others value their individual personal comfort over the length of 
their lives and will refuse otherwise life-sustaining treatment if they believe the 
treatment will cause them to sacrifice their comfort. The purpose of ACP is to 
help mentally capable adults express their individual goals, values, and 
treatment preferences prior to becoming unable to communicate so that 
medical providers and loved ones can make treatment decisions that best align 
with those adults’ wishes. When persons in need of medical care have not done 
ACP, medical providers and loved ones are left to guess what treatment 
decisions to make and may experience guilt or moral distress if they believe 
they have made the “wrong” choice. 
Not all ACP, however, is capable of bringing clarity to the treatment 
decision-making process. Simply asking persons to complete advance 
directives typically fails as a helpful treatment guide. ACP that occurs as part 
of a conversational process in which persons have the opportunity to reflect, 
understand, and make informed choices about their treatment preferences has 
a better chance of being useful in treatment decision making. This paper 
explores the ethical and legal foundations of ACP, demonstrates how robust 
ACP is superior to basic ACP, and argues that health care organizations have 
a moral obligation to develop robust ACP programs. 
 
* Director, Center for Bioethics, Humanities, and Advance Care Planning, Gunderson Health 
System. The author thanks Bernard “Bud” Hammes, Ph.D., for his support and collaborations in 
the preparations of this manuscript, and the organizers of both the 2015 American Society for 
Bioethics and Humanities Annual Conference and the 2016 Saint Louis University Law School, 
Center for Health Law Studies Annual Symposium, as well as the audience members of the 
sessions where early iterations of this paper were presented and received comment. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Not all persons have the same treatment threshold. Some persons are 
willing to accept any available medical intervention that can extend life by any 
amount of time, regardless of physical debility, potential discomfort of the 
treatment, or the predictable negative impact treatment will have on their daily 
activities. Others, though, are not willing to accept all available medical 
interventions as needed just to extend life. Some of these individuals will forgo 
needed medical interventions if the interventions are likely to negatively 
interfere at all with daily activities, even if the consequence is death. A recent 
patient of mine, for example, elected to forgo a life-saving operation to remove 
a dead part of her intestine because she did not want to live the rest of her life 
managing a colostomy bag (a bag surgically attached to the gut that holds 
diverted fecal matter and must be emptied regularly). Because her dead 
intestine prevented her from digesting food, she died a few days after refusing 
surgery. 
Since treatment thresholds can vary widely, medical professionals are 
trained not to make assumptions about individuals’ treatment preferences.1 As 
a result, the default position of medical practice in the United States is to use 
all available interventions to treat unless the intervention is judged by the 
physician responsible for the individual’s care to be medically unsound (e.g., 
continuing ventilator support for an individual with no neurological or cardiac 
activity) or the individual has made his or her treatment preference known to 
medical providers.2 When a person’s treatment preferences are unknown to his 
or her medical providers, that person is at risk of receiving treatment not 
aligned with that person’s goals of care—that is, the person may receive too 
much, or even in some cases, too little treatment for what the individual would 
have been otherwise willing to accept. As a practical matter, when treatment 
does not align with an individual’s treatment preference, the utilization of 
health care resources becomes inefficient, often leading to wasteful medical 
spending.3 
Advance care planning (ACP) is one way that is now broadly referenced 
and utilized to understand persons’ treatment preferences, which helps to better 
ensure that the individuals in need of medical care receive the treatments that 
they want and, equally important, that they avoid receiving treatments they do 
 
 1. ALBERT R. JONSEN ET AL., CLINICAL ETHICS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL 
DECISIONS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE § 2.0.1 (8th ed. 2015). 
 2. See AM. MED. ASS’N, COUNSEL ON ETHICAL & JUD. AFFS., CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 
§ 5.3–5.5 (2016). 
 3. See Thomas D. Harter, Why Medicare Should Pay for Advance Care Planning, 23 
PROGRESS PALLIATIVE CARE 148, 148 (2015); Thomas Harter, What Kind of Advance Care 
Planning Should CMS Pay For?, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Mar. 19, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/ 
blog/2015/03/19/what-kind-of-advance-care-planning-should-cmspay-for/#more-45549. 
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not want. ACP is commonly defined as a process by which mentally capable 
adults identify health care treatment preferences or health care agents prior to 
becoming mentally incapable.4 Typically, ACP is most utilized in situations 
when persons need medical treatment but cannot clearly communicate with 
medical providers in order to participate in the treatment decision-making 
process. Knowing individuals’ treatment preferences in advance of medical 
complications that could prevent them from participating in future treatment 
discussions is now viewed as such an important component of patient care—in 
part because of concerns of mistreating patients and the misutilization of 
resources—that in October of 2014, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) issued two new practice billing codes in the revisions to its 
payment policies.5 Once in effect, these billing codes, 99497 and 99498, will 
allow physicians to bill for the time they take having ACP conversations with 
their patients.6 
This move by CMS to allow for the billing of ACP conversations between 
physicians and their patients is a strong indication that the work of providing 
ACP to individuals is falling to health care organizations. Even if this is not the 
case, there is still a strong argument to be made that health care organizations 
have a responsibility to help both their patient and provider populations by 
developing ACP programs. First, health care organizations are the institutions 
responsible for providing medical care in the communities they serve. Second, 
the medical providers employed by health care organizations are the 
individuals responsible for providing the clinic-based and hospital-based 
treatment to patients, including patients who can no longer make their own 
treatment decisions. Lastly, as organizations with discretion over relatively 
large spending budgets, they are in a position to provide the patient education, 
ACP training and staff, and physical space necessary to develop ACP 
programs. 
One potential concern with billing for ACP is that not all ACP practices or 
programs are equally valuable to patients. It was once assumed that living wills 
or advance directives alone would suffice as proper indications of persons’ 
treatment preferences near the end of life. Yet, as discussed below, evidence 
shows living wills and advance directives alone do little to ensure that the 
medical care incapacitated patients receive actually aligns with their 
preferences. Given the promise of ACP to help identify and align persons’ 
 
 4. Arianne Brinkman-Stoppelenburg et al., The Effects of Advance Care Planning on End-
of-Life Care: A Systematic Review, 28 PALLIATIVE MED. 1000, 1001 (2014). 
 5. Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule, 
Clinical Laboratory Fee Schedule, Access to Identifiable Data for the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovation Models & Other Revisions to Part B for CY 2015, 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 
67670–71 (Nov. 13, 2014). 
 6. Id. at 67663. 
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treatment preferences with the medical care they receive during times of 
mental incapacity, this paper thusly addresses the question of whether health 
care organizations have a moral obligation to develop robust ACP programs. 
Section II discusses the historical foundations of ACP. Beginning with the 
case of Karen Ann Quinlan—a quintessential case in treatment decision 
making at the end of life in absence of known treatment preferences—the 
ethical and legal justifications for basic ACP are detailed. Section III 
demonstrates the failure of basic ACP in practice, while defining and 
distinguishing robust ACP from basic ACP and describing how robust ACP is 
superior to basic ACP. 
Section IV demonstrates how robust ACP aligns with and is supported by 
several moral frameworks including Principlism, Utilitarianism, Virtue, and 
Care. The discussion in this section is not meant to be fully exhaustive of the 
different moral justifications of robust ACP; instead, it shows how and why 
there is a reasonable argument to be made justifying a moral obligation of 
health care organizations to develop robust ACP programs. Lastly, the paper 
concludes that the current status quo of ACP in health care settings is morally 
unacceptable, that there is indeed a moral obligation of health care 
organizations to develop robust ACP programs, and that more research is 
needed to clearly identify the metrics that separate basic ACP from robust ACP 
and to allow for further moral and legal distinction between the two. 
II.  FOUNDATIONS OF ACP 
A. The Case of Karen Ann Quinlan 
While attending a party in 1975, Karen Ann Quinlan ingested a 
combination of aspirin, barbiturates, and valium, which caused her breathing to 
stop for a prolonged period of time.7 After being resuscitated by paramedics, 
Quinlan was transferred to Newton Memorial Hospital in New Jersey, where 
she was placed on a ventilator.8 Although her body was still functioning, 
Quinlan had suffered irreversible brain damage and was ultimately diagnosed 
as being in a persistent vegetative state.9 
Since Quinlan had permanently lost the ability to make her own decisions, 
her parents made the decision to discontinue her ventilator support, expecting 
she would die soon afterward.10 Knowing the stakes of the request, the hospital 
 
 7. In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 806 (N.J. Ch. 1975), modified and remanded, 355 A.2d 
647 (N.J. 1976). 
 8. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d. 647, 654 (N.J. 1976). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Robert S. Olick & Paul W. Armstrong, In Re Karen Ann Quinlan (1976): Establishing a 
Patient’s Right to Die in Dignity, in COURTING JUSTICE: TEN NEW JERSEY CASES THAT SHOOK 
THE NATION 77–78 (Paul L. Tractenberg ed., 2013). 
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would not honor this wish without a court order.11 Eleven months after her 
hospitalization, the New Jersey Supreme Court appointed Quinlan’s father as 
her guardian, granting him the right to make all her medical decisions, 
including the right to discontinue extraordinary means of treatment.12 In its 
ruling, the court claimed that because of Quinlan’s poor prognosis, her case 
was unique to others in which treatment was ordered and that the degree of her 
injury weakened the State’s interest in keeping her alive while subsequently 
strengthening her individual right to privacy.13 Quinlan died in 1985—nine 
years after her ventilator support was stopped—when her body succumbed to 
pneumonia.14 
Quinlan’s case is discussed here for three reasons. First, her case garnered 
national media attention,15 and for many Americans who saw the earliest news 
reports about her case, it was the first time they had been presented with 
questions about the goals of medicine. Second, those who remember the 
earliest reports about this case are now at a target age for doing ACP. Ideally, 
all competent adults should undergo some ACP process. Those aged fifty-five 
and older, however, are more likely to need ACP because of their advancing 
age and, thus, the increased likelihood of having greater health care needs 
requiring medical intervention. Third, her case brought to the forefront at least 
two elements directly related to the philosophical importance of ACP. 
First, Quinlan’s case demonstrated how far medical technologies and 
innovations had advanced. The general public saw how it was now possible to 
keep a person alive even after suffering from neurocognitive devastation. Since 
neurocognitive functioning—broadly construed as the ability to meaningfully 
interact with oneself, others, and one’s environment—is generally treated as an 
integral component of personhood,16 Quinlan’s situation caused people to 
question what is most important to them as individuals once consciousness is 
gone: the quantity or quality of one’s life. 
Second, her case highlighted the importance of and legal complexities 
surrounding the newly emerging role of surrogate health care agents. By virtue 
of her neurologic devastation, Quinlan could no longer make her own 
treatment decisions. The United States (U.S.) court system therefore had to 
decide what level of protections should be afforded to Quinlan in her 
debilitated state and what level of authority and legal protections could be, or 
should be, granted to those who were now responsible for making her 
 
 11. Id. at 78. 
 12. Id. at 79. 
 13. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d. at 664. 
 14. Olick & Armstrong, supra note 10, at 85. 
 15. Id. at 86, 94. 
 16. Martha J. Farah & Andrea S. Heberlein, Personhood and Neuroscience: Naturalizing or 
Nihilating?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Jan. 2007, at 37, 40. 
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treatment decisions. In regard to the legal complexities surrounding surrogate 
decision making, Quinlan’s case also demonstrated the U.S. court system’s 
general unwillingness to intervene in medical decision making. Many U.S. 
court decisions regarding surrogate decision making define the court’s role as 
ensuring the rights of patients are not unduly infringed upon throughout the 
decision-making process, but courts commonly refrain from exerting authority 
in making particular treatment decisions.17 In Quinlan’s case, once the court 
ruled that forgoing ventilator support would not unfairly infringe on her 
constitutionally-protected rights, it further ruled that the actual decision to 
remove ventilator support was a private matter between her physicians and her 
guardian.18 
B. Moral and Legal Foundations of ACP 
As exemplified in the Quinlan case, the practice of medicine has 
undergone incredible changes over the past 100 years. We have gone from a 
time when there were few treatments that cured or effectively managed a 
disease to a time when there are not only many effective ways of treating or 
managing an array of illnesses or injuries, but also to a time when these 
treatments are relatively open and available to large populations. These 
changes have resulted in a transition from a time when people often died after 
a relatively brief period of illness to a time when life can be extended for 
persons suffering from a variety of diseases and loss of functional capacity. 
During this period of rapid progress of medical science, we have also seen 
a clear shift in medical decision making. Whereas physicians historically 
controlled treatment decisions, patients are now expected to decide the 
treatments they will and will not accept. This change occurred in conjunction 
with many social changes where individual and civil rights have taken front 
stage, often labeled as a patients’ rights movement.19 Today, medically-
paternalistic decision making has been usurped and replaced by shared 
 
 17. See Noreen R. Henig et al., Biomedical Ethics and the Withdrawal of Advanced Life 
Support, 52 ANN. REV. MED. 79, 81 (2001) (“In the United States, both the common-law right of 
self-determination and the constitutionally derived right of privacy support legally competent 
adults’ rights to be in charge of their own health care, even if it means refusing treatment.”); 
Christopher M. Burkle & Jeffre J. Benson, End-of-Life Care Decisions: Importance of Reviewing 
Systems and Limitations After 2 Recent North American Cases, 87 MAYO CLINIC PROCS. 1098, 
1098 (2012); Claire M. McGowan, Legal Aspects of End-of-Life Care, CRITICAL CARE NURSE, 
Oct. 2011, at 64, 68. 
 18. See McGowan, supra note 17, at 65. 
 19. See Glyn Elwyn et al., Shared Decision Making: A Model for Clinical Practice, 27 J. 
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1361, 1361 (2012) (noting that “sharing decisions, as opposed to clinicians 
making decisions on behalf of patients, is gaining increasing prominence in health care policy”). 
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decision-making models where patients and physicians make treatment 
decisions together based on patients’ values and preferences.20 
With patients now playing a central role in medical decision making, 
questions about how to make vital medical decisions arise whenever patients 
are mentally incapable of making their own treatment decisions. Given the 
association of patient-centered medical decision making and the possibility that 
some individuals—at the time they need to make medical decisions—lack 
decisional capacity, it seems obvious and reasonable to say that individuals 
should have the right to expressly clarify their treatment preferences for future 
medical care in advance of their potential incapacity. This way, patients’ 
values and preferences can be clear to families and health professionals so that 
if patients cannot participate in medical decision making because of incapacity, 
medical decisions still can be made in ways that reflect the patients’ values and 
preferences. 
Although it is now widely accepted that competent adults can plan for 
future medical decisions should they become incapable,21 the extension of a 
patients right to decide in future situations was not completely clear to all at 
first. Some argued that when a person loses decisional capacity, certain rights 
can no longer be exercised—such as the right to vote or get married—and that 
this reasoning extended to medical decision making.22 It makes sense that 
when individuals’ cognitive functioning has been impaired, their abilities to 
make well-reasoned, informed decisions in the moment are thusly 
compromised. However, this argument does not adequately speak to what 
occurs with ACP. 
When individuals make decisions about future medical care, the decisions 
are not really about specific treatments per se but about how different states of 
health accord with individuals’ values and preferences. To plan for future 
medical decisions is to identify the thresholds at which the goals of medical 
care would change based on the circumstances of persons’ current or future 
medical conditions.23 If a mentally-capable person who struggles with 
understanding medical details is asked to choose whether to have 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) at some future point, and this option is 
presented with no other contextual information, then—yes—her choice might 
be uninformed and might raise questions about whether medical providers 
should honor her choice if her heart or breathing stops. However, if this person 
 
 20. See id. 
 21. See NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING PERSONS WITH 
MENTAL DISORDERS THAT MAY AFFECT DECISIONMAKING CAPACITY 29 (1998). 
 22. See Thaddeus M. Pope, Legal Briefing: The New Patient Self-Determination Act, 24 J. 
CLINICAL ETHICS 156, 156 (2013). 
 23. EMANUEL L.L. ET AL., ADVANCE CARE PLANNING M1-1 to -2 (EPEC Project eds., 
1999). 
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is asked to make a choice about CPR after a recent diagnosis of severe 
congestive heart failure, and she communicates that she values her 
independence and does not wish to ever live long term in a nursing home, she 
could make an informed decision about CPR: reasonably refuse it if a 
successful CPR attempt would likely result in her needing long-term or 
permanent nursing care. 
In the United States, the social policy and legal systems eventually and 
universally supported the notion that competent adults are free to make 
advance medical decisions for future events. Legislative efforts in all fifty 
states first recognized living wills and, later, affirmed the rights of individuals 
to appoint surrogate health care agents—who could refuse treatment on the 
behalf of patients—via powers of attorney for health care and advance 
directives.24 
Basic principles of biomedical ethics added support to these efforts. For 
many, the principles of respect for patient autonomy and nonmaleficence 
provide sound rationale not only for individuals to make their own informed 
treatment decisions but also to plan for potential future medical decisions, to 
communicate those decisions in advance directives, and to have those plans 
followed by surrogate decision makers—especially when individuals opt for 
less medical treatment than medical providers recommend. Tom Beauchamp 
and James Childress, for example, root the establishment of advance directives 
in the principle of respect for autonomy, but they describe the ethical 
importance and implications of advance directives under the principle of 
nonmaleficence.25 On their view, whereas respect for patient autonomy 
supports the idea that persons should be reasonably free to direct their medical 
care via advance directives, nonmaleficence supports the importance of the 
legal protections granted via advance directives to elected health care agents 
when making decisions that keep incapacitated individuals from receiving 
medical care they would otherwise perceive as harmful if they retained 
capacity.26 
Further legal and ethical support of ACP also has come via the concept of 
informed consent. Expressed in international documents like the Nuremburg 
Code as well as supreme court decisions in multiple countries, informed 
consent has become a separate legal doctrine and professional ethic that—
except in emergency cases—requires patients to make informed, voluntary 
 
 24. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMED. ETHICS 103, 
133–58 (5th ed. 2001). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 139–40, 186–87. 
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acceptances before medical treatment can be provided to them.27 In short, the 
doctrine of informed consent mandates that treatments should be provided to 
competent adults only after they are fully informed of the different treatment 
options available to them as well as the risks and benefits of those treatments.28 
This doctrine affirmed the asymmetrical rights of patients to refuse treatment 
recommendations as long as they were competent, informed, and free to act, 
but it did not affirm the right to demand or require physicians to provide 
treatments or tests when physicians judge those treatments and tests to be 
ineffective or capable of causing serious harm.29 
Given the U.S. court system’s involvement in the issues of informed 
consent and end-of-life medical decisions as well as the subsequent laws 
passed to legitimize the use of advance directives, it is not surprising that ACP 
is easily tied to and treated as a matter of patient rights and patient autonomy. 
Conceptually, advance directives appear to be the ultimate expression of 
individual choices and the embodiment of patients’ rights to make decisions 
about their future medical care. However, one result of tying ACP to patient 
rights and patient autonomy is that other conceptual and ethical constructions 
of ACP and advance directives are undervalued or depreciated. For example, 
Edmund Pellegrino long argued that the purpose of health care is to help 
individuals continue their lives as they have conceived them and that this aim 
constitutes an intrinsic good that ought to be valued more than the expression 
of patient rights.30 On this view, ACP is more than an expression of rights; it is 
a tool of health care that helps persons identify and communicate to medical 
providers and loved ones both how best to use medicine to achieve what they 
conceive to be the best life possible and the thresholds at which medicine can 
no longer help restore them to their individual conceptions of health. 
 
 27. 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL 
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 181–82 (1949) [hereinafter TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS]. See also, e.g., 
Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, ¶¶ 14, 16 (Austl.). 
 28. See TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 27; Rogers, 175 CLR 479, ¶¶ 14, 16. 
 29. Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for Non-Beneficial Medical Treatment, 325 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 512, 514 (1991). 
 30. See EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT’S GOOD: THE 
RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE 76–77 (1988); Edmund D. Pellegrino, The 
Commodification of Medical and Health Care: The Moral Consequences of a Paradigm Shift 
from a Professional to a Market Ethic, 24 J. MED. & PHIL. 243, 259 (1999) (discussing the 
intrinsic goodness of health care). 
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III.  BASIC AND ROBUST ACP 
A. Basic ACP 
Legislative support for ACP arrived in 1990 with the Patient Self-
Determination Act.31 Enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act, the Patient Self-Determination Act requires health care organizations to 
provide information and education about advance directives to individuals 
admitted to their facilities.32 Advance directives—including power of attorney 
for health care documents, living wills, and Physician Orders for Life-
Sustaining Treatment33—are instruments used to document ACP preferences, 
including treatment goals and decision makers. This requirement of asking for 
and providing information about advance directives to hospitalized individuals 
is the minimal ethical and legal standard for ACP among the general public and 
health care organizations.34 “Basic ACP” therefore refers to this minimal 
requirement of asking persons, namely those who are hospitalized, whether 
they have an advance directive and, if not, whether they would like 
information about completing one. Anything above and beyond this minimum 
regarding ACP is perhaps considered praiseworthy, but not yet expected or 
morally obligatory. 
In essence, basic ACP focuses on document completion. The assumption 
with basic ACP is that individuals already know, or have at least a general idea 
of, what their treatment preferences are or who they believe might be a good 
health care agent in the event they become mentally incapacitated.35 It is 
further assumed that should a person’s advance directive be utilized, the 
person’s health care agent will know what health care decisions to make that 
best align with the incapacitated person’s treatment preferences—either 
through prior conversations with the incapacitated person or simply by reading 
and interpreting the advance directive document.36 
Unfortunately, research over the past twenty-five to thirty years has 
demonstrated that these assumptions are false. Not only is it the case that the 
completion of advance directives among the general adult population remains 
relatively low (around twenty-five to thirty percent), but the documents 
themselves often fail to provide useful clinical guidance because of their focus 
on specific treatment decisions that exist outside of a clinical context and 
 
 31. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-
15 to -16, -204 to -06. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, 
HASTINGS CENT. REP., Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 30, 34. 
 36. Id. 
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because the decisions documented in advance directives often are made 
without exploration into persons’ individual value systems.37 This research 
also demonstrates that health care agents typically are ill-prepared to act in 
their roles as surrogate treatment decision-makers. In one review of studies 
involving surrogate decision-makers, at least one third of patient-designated 
and next-of-kin decision makers incorrectly predicted patients’ end-of-life 
treatment preferences.38 Furthermore, recent research demonstrates that when 
persons engage in basic ACP, the choices they elect on an advance directive 
can be influenced simply by how the treatment options are listed on the 
document. This suggests that persons who complete advance directives without 
engaging in conversation about their individual life goals and values may make 
treatment decisions on their advance directives that are not reflective of their 
actual treatment preferences.39 
B. Robust ACP and the Failure of Basic ACP 
Why has basic ACP failed in practice? Apart from overall low rates of 
document completion among the general public—which is its own 
multifactorial problem, including issues such as unsuccessful community 
engagement and a general reluctance of persons to discuss with loved ones 
treatment preferences that have end-of-life implications—basic ACP does not 
account for the complex medical possibilities that create nuance in the 
treatment decision-making process. Furthermore, basic ACP does not have any 
way to guide persons through reflection of their individual goals and values 
that may translate into treatment decisions, nor does basic ACP have a way to 
ensure that those responsible for making treatment decisions for incapacitated 
persons accurately understand and interpret incapacitated persons’ treatment 
preferences. Basic ACP—again, ACP that focuses only on advance directive 
 
 37. See Stacey M. Fischer et al., Advance Directive Discussions: Lost in Translation or Lost 
Opportunities, 15 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 86 (2012); Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 35, at 32, 34; 
Joan Teno et al., Advance Directive for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: Effectiveness with the 
Patient Self-Determination Act and the SUPPORT Intervention, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC. 500, 
506 (1997) (finding that only forty percent of surrogates found the patient’s advanced directive 
helpful in making end-of-life decisions); Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of 
Advance Directives: A History and Assessment of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 32 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 249, 276–78 (1997). 
 38. David I. Shalowitz et al., The Accuracy of Surrogate Decision Makers: A Systematic 
Review, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 493, 496 (2006). 
 39. See generally Scott D. Halpern et al., Default Options In Advance Directives Influence 
How Patients Set Goals for End-Of-Life Care, 32 HEALTH AFFS. 408 (2013); Catherine L. 
Auriemma et al., Stability of End-of-Life Preferences: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 174 
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1085 (2014) (looking at patients’ choices in treatment options in advance 
directives over time). 
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document completion—lacks any sort of description or recognition of a 
systematic approach to the planning process. 
As noted in the 2014 Institute of Medicine report, Dying in America, 
successful ACP requires far more than just document completion.40 Per the 
report, successful ACP programs require meaningful conversations between 
the persons doing the planning and their loved ones (especially those chosen as 
health care agents) and involvement with treating physicians to help address 
medical questions that arise during the planning process.41 They also require 
institutional support and resources directed toward training in ACP 
conversations, the documentation and retrieval of advance directives, and 
establishing and maintaining a culture of accountability in which medical 
providers are willing to trust and honor a patient’s or health care agent’s 
treatment decisions as truly reflective of the patient’s wishes.42 In short, 
successful ACP involves a complete approach, in which the goals include not 
only document completion but also helping persons reflect on their individual 
goals and values, supporting discussions between the persons doing the 
planning and their health care agents and medical providers, and establishing a 
system that allows health care organizations to easily store and retrieve 
advance directives as needed. When ACP involves these elements of a 
systematic approach, this is what is meant by “robust” ACP. 
Another important aspect of robust ACP, as noted in the Institute of 
Medicine report, is that it should have demonstrable and reproducible 
outcomes.43 This is an important piece of my overall argument that health care 
organizations have a moral obligation to develop robust ACP programs. We 
know that the status quo of basic ACP fails in practice. Yet the reason we can 
say that basic ACP fails in practice is because there is evidence that robust 
ACP is a superior form of ACP. Without such evidence the force of my 
argument diminishes, since I could not then successfully argue why, even with 
the failure of basic ACP in practice, there is a moral obligation for health care 
organizations to supplant basic ACP with robust ACP. The need for evidence 
of the success of robust ACP is further validated when we consider that 
fulfilling this obligation has financial and resource costs to health care 
organizations. 
There is at least one ACP program described by the Institute of Medicine 
with demonstrable and reproducible outcomes that also meets the “robust” 
ACP criteria.44 Gundersen Health System’s Respecting Choices model is 
 
 40. COMM. ON APPROACHING DEATH & INST. OF MED., DYING IN AMERICA: IMPROVING 
QUALITY AND HONORING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES NEAR THE END OF LIFE 117–18 (2014). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 6–20. 
 43. Id. at 12. 
 44. Id. at 179–81. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] IS THERE A MORAL OBLIGATION FOR HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 57 
widely recognized as a highly successful ACP program.45 Gundersen Health 
System is located in La Crosse, Wisconsin.46 Outcomes data shows that as of 
2008, ninety-six percent of decedents in La Crosse County had some sort of 
advance care plan that was documented in their medical records and that 
treatment decisions were consistent with patients’ treatment preferences and 
ACP instructions 99.5% of the time.47 The program produces educational 
materials for persons wanting to create advance care plans, it trains ACP 
facilitators to converse with persons during the ACP process about their 
individual values, goals, and treatment preferences, and it works to ensure 
advance care plans are available to patients, medical providers, and patients’ 
loved ones wherever they receive care in the community.48 
The Respecting Choices program also has been adapted and implemented 
with equal success in many other health care settings both nationally and 
internationally. In a randomized controlled trial, Maureen Lyon, et al., utilized 
this program in doing ACP with teens with cancer, showing the program 
decreased anxiety and depression among study participants from baseline to 
three months post-intervention.49 Kristen Pecanac, et al., further showed that 
this program was able to increase the prevalence of advance directives in 
several racially and ethnically diverse communities in the United States 
(overall from 25.8% to 38.4%).50 Jürgen in der Schmitten, et al., implemented 
this program in German nursing homes, showing a significant increase in 
advance directive completion (36% among the study group compared to 4.1% 
in the control group) with noted relevance in medical decision making.51 In 
another randomized controlled trial in Australia, Karen Detering, et al., showed 
that 84% of the study subjects who underwent ACP expressed their treatment 
preferences or appointed health care agents, or both, and that as a result of 
ACP, families of deceased patients experienced notably less stress, anxiety, 
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and depression after the death than those of family members of a deceased 
patients who died without having done any ACP.52 
This section highlights sound, practical reasons why robust ACP should be 
the new ACP standard for health care organizations in the United States. 
However, it is not yet clear how or why these reasons translate into a moral 
obligation for health care organizations to develop robust ACP programs. I 
now turn to add support to this obligation by showing how robust ACP aligns 
with several moral frameworks commonly utilized within the realm of medical 
ethics. 
IV.  MORAL FRAMEWORKS SUPPORTING ROBUST ACP 
The purpose of this section is not to give a fully detailed account of how 
different moral frameworks support ACP in general or robust ACP in 
particular. Instead, the purpose of this section is to give reasonable accounts of 
how each of the following moral frameworks—Principlism, Utilitarianism, 
Virtue, and Care—can be used to justify health care organizations having a 
moral obligation to develop robust ACP programs. Absent in this section, then, 
is any sort of exploration or justification about how or why each of the 
frameworks discussed should themselves be valued as barometers of moral 
action. It is merely assumed in this section that each of the moral frameworks 
discussed is a valid construction of how persons think about morality in 
medical practice. 
A. Principlism 
Perhaps one of the most well-known frameworks for addressing ethical 
issues in medical practice is the principle-based approach of Beauchamp and 
Childress.53 Each of the four major principles discussed by Beauchamp and 
Childress, as well as the principle of informed consent (which they subsume 
under respect for autonomy), is demonstrated in robust ACP. 
As Beauchamp and Childress describe it, respect for autonomy is a 
principle in which there is an acknowledgement that individuals have the “right 
to hold views, make choices, and to take actions based on personal values and 
beliefs.”54 In addition to being a moral right of autonomous individuals—
broadly construed as individuals who are capable of making their own 
decisions55—the ability of autonomous individuals to hold views, make 
decisions, and act on their personal values and beliefs is a constitutionally-
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protected right.56 ACP aims to help individuals express their goals and values 
that will guide treatment decision making during times when those individuals 
are not decisional.57 ACP, in essence, aims to give individuals a voice in their 
medical care even after they have become voiceless. In this regard, a core 
element of ACP is respect for autonomy. 
One of the key components to making autonomous decisions is knowledge 
and understanding about one’s available choices.58 Obtaining informed consent 
is also a legal requirement prior to initiating any treatment with a patient.59 
Herein is a significant moral distinction between basic and robust ACP. As 
previously noted, basic ACP operates under the assumption that individuals 
have a priori treatment preferences that are well-formed based on their 
individual goals and values.60 Yet there is no way under basic ACP to verify 
whether individuals have or have not received important medical information 
about their states of health that would reasonably shape or influence their 
treatment preferences. Imagine, for example, someone with a new diagnosis of 
congestive heart failure is completing an advance directive under the rubric of 
basic ACP and is attempting to decide whether he or she wants CPR in the 
event of a cardiopulmonary arrest. How is this individual to know whether 
CPR would or would not be medically advisable prior to completing the form, 
and how would a physician know whether to question the individual’s CPR 
choice once the advance directive is complete? In this case it is clear that the 
individual is not making an informed choice, but unless the physician is 
prompted to review the advance directive with the patient, it is likely the 
individual’s choice will go unquestioned. 
Robust ACP—as an intensive or comprehensive form of ACP—makes it a 
point to have individuals reflect on their decisions and to uncover gaps in 
understanding that could have significant impacts on their choices.61 A priori 
preference formation is not assumed under robust ACP; instead, robust ACP 
recognizes that treatment preferences depend on contextual information.62 As 
such robust ACP aligns with ethical and professional obligations of informed 
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consent to ensure individuals are making well-informed decisions when 
creating advance care plans. 
Robust ACP can also be seen in terms of the principles of beneficence and 
nonmaleficence. In general, beneficence is about intentionally acting for the 
sake of patient benefit,63 while nonmaleficence is acting to avoid patient 
harm.64 We know from the studies conducted with robust ACP programs that 
they are proven to improve patient outcomes in several significant ways, such 
as helping to create treatment plans that are better followed by health care 
agents and medical providers, by allowing patients to receive the levels of care 
they want, and by helping improve patients’ overall experiences of illness and 
death.65 In this regard, robust ACP can be valued in terms of acting to benefit 
patients and avoiding harm to them. By helping to ensure that treatment 
decisions for incapacitated patients align with their individual treatment 
preferences, robust ACP better ensures that incapacitated patients receive the 
treatments they want while also helping them to avoid getting treatments they 
do not want. An additional benefit here with robust ACP is that by further 
helping improve the accuracy of the treatment decision-making process for 
patients (who are receiving the treatments), their loved ones (who may 
otherwise question whether a treatment decision was the “right” one), and 
medical providers (who are responsible for the actual care of patients), robust 
ACP can further help diminish the possibility that medical providers, health 
care agents, and patients’ loved ones will experience moral distress over a 
treatment decision. 
Robust ACP also exemplifies the principle of justice in at least two ways. 
If we think about justice as all people in the same situation being treated 
equally and fairly regarding decisional processes without being subjected to 
third-party coercion or bias, then the first way in which robust ACP aligns with 
justice is that it insulates incapacitated persons from being subjected to third-
party decisions based on interests that are not their own. Again, for persons 
with unknown treatment preferences who need medical treatment, the default 
position of medical providers is to treat to the fullest extent possible.66 The 
reason for this default is twofold: (1) so that medical providers are not put in 
the position of trying to assume a patient’s treatment preferences by offering 
too little treatment; and because (2) in acute situations, the failure to treat 
can—and often does—result in the death of the patient. As a former attending 
physician of mine would say of clinical ethics cases when it was unclear 
whether an incapacitated patient with unknown treatment preferences would 
want to continue or forgo life-sustaining treatment, providers only get one 
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chance to make the wrong choice—meaning if there is a decision to forgo 
effective life-sustaining treatment, and the incapacitated patient truly wanted to 
continue with treatment, the decision to forgo treatment not only would be 
wrong but also likely uncorrectable since the removal of life-sustaining 
treatment usually has a fatal result. 
The problem with this reasoning is that it is, itself, a value judgment about 
providing medical treatment to patients in need. Whether and why this default 
position is ethically or morally justifiable in all cases is not in question here. 
The point here is that persons with unknown treatment preferences will be 
subjected to treatments they otherwise might not want, especially in the case of 
an acute medical event, which could leave them in permanently incapacitated 
states and continuing to receive the otherwise unwanted treatments 
indefinitely. Further, the decisions about whether or not to initially treat or 
continue ongoing treatment are not decisions they (the incapacitated patients) 
get to participate in. 
Robust ACP can help correct patients being exposed to this default 
position within medical practice by providing them the opportunity to identify 
their treatment preferences and to have those preferences recognized and 
honored by medical providers. Likewise, when persons’ treatment preferences 
are unknown, loved ones might be asked to assist in the decision-making 
processes and might use their own values and beliefs to guide decision making 
instead of trying to make decisions for those incapacitated individuals as they 
would if they were decisional. Here, again, robust ACP helps to ensure that 
incapacitated persons are treated equally and fairly in the treatment decision-
making process by allowing them to articulate and incorporate their own 
treatment preferences, goals, and values in the decision-making process. 
Tied to this first way in which robust ACP exemplifies justice, robust ACP 
also exemplifies justice regarding fair use of resources and the individual 
economic considerations of incapacitated persons receiving medical treatment. 
As I have argued elsewhere, the failure to implement ACP programs leads to 
wasteful medical spending at the end of life.67 This is based on Medicare data 
that shows having more medical treatment within the last two years of life does 
not actually help improve the quality or length of one’s lifespan.68 Maintaining 
the status quo of ACP is thereby economically unjust as the cost of spending 
on end-of-life care is an economic burden paid by all U.S. citizens that is not 
only unsustainable, but it does not actually improve end-of-life care. Secondly, 
data shows that most persons prefer limited medical interventions when they 
are nearing death.69 Unfortunately, some individuals who prefer limited 
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interventions are likely to experience an acute medical event in which they 
become mentally incapacitated prior to exploring and articulating their 
treatment preferences. These individuals will be subjected to the default 
position of medical practice to treat to the fullest extent possible. As a result, 
these individuals will also therefore be subjected to whatever economic costs 
are associated with receiving otherwise unwanted treatment, including costs 
associated with the treatments themselves, as well as legal fees associated with 
any estate issues that might need to be addressed once they become 
incapacitated. 
B. Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism is a framework in which the moral worth of an action is 
determined not just by the consequences of the action but also by whether the 
action itself complies with desired outcomes or socially accepted principles or 
rules.70 For incapacitated individuals in need of medical care, decisions are 
made according to what third parties—namely, medical providers and 
surrogate decision makers—believe are in those persons’ best interests.71 What 
constitutes “best interest” is a balance between a patient’s current medical 
state, the available treatment options, and the patient’s known treatment 
preferences.72 When persons’ treatment preferences are unknown, medical 
providers and surrogates are left to determine whether available treatment 
options align with those persons’ goals and values.73 The less that is known 
about a person’s goals and values, the harder it is to determine what the desired 
outcome of treatment should be. Presuming a person’s treatment preferences, 
goals, or values are completely unknown, the desired outcome, as noted in the 
previous section, is a default position of maximal treatment to sustain life.74 
Robust ACP allows individuals to articulate for their health care agents and 
medical providers what are their preferences, goals, and values—in short, their 
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desired treatment outcomes. As a matter of medical providers and health care 
agents acting to make treatment decisions for incapacitated patients, knowing 
those patients’ preferences, goals, and values allows providers and health care 
agents to make decisions that best align with what those patients’ would select 
for themselves if they were decisional. In terms of Utilitarianism, robust ACP 
is morally justified as a way to establish the outcomes for which treatment 
decisions should aim. 
As discussed in the previous subsection, robust ACP also aligns with 
accepted ethical principles of medical practice. As such, what constitutes 
morality in medical practice in terms of Utilitarianism is whether or not 
decisions comply with these accepted norms of medical practice. Robust ACP 
thusly aligns with Utilitarianism in that it allows for medical providers and 
health care agents to make decisions for incapacitated persons in ways that are 
supported by common principles of medical practice. 
C. Virtue Approach 
Morality based on virtue focuses on character development. This 
framework centers on the question: How does a virtuous person act?75 In this 
very broad sense, robust ACP does not necessarily inspire one to adopt traits or 
act in ways that might be considered virtuous. It actually may be the case that 
through the process of ACP, one might articulate treatment preferences that 
others find to lack virtuous content. For example, if someone in an extremely 
poor state of health (i.e., a state in which aggressive forms of treatment 
predictably will not work to restore health or promote life) prefers to receive 
full treatment measures without concern for the overall ineffectiveness of 
treatment or the potential financial burden selecting full treatment could place 
on the person’s loved ones, then one could reasonably argue that the individual 
is being selfish or callous to the concerns of medical providers or loved ones. 
However, a basic tenet of a virtue-based approach to morality is personal 
reflection.76 One cannot hope to attain a virtuous character without reflecting 
on how one’s current character traits or choices may or may not align with 
being virtuous.77 So in terms of virtue, it is preferable, as a means of 
cultivating a virtuous character, for an individual to reflect on his or her 
treatment preferences, goals, and values despite whether or not that individual 
will actually ever face a situation in which he or she becomes incapacitated and 
treatment decisions fall to third parties. A basic element of robust ACP is to 
encourage reflection and understanding on the part of persons doing the 
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planning,78 and so, at least in terms of virtue, it is a practice that is supported 
under this moral framework. This is especially true in contrast to basic ACP, 
which asks persons to articulate their treatment preferences without actually 
urging reflection of those choices and understanding of how those choices 
align with persons’ actual states of health and realistic medical possibilities. 
D. Care Approach 
Robust ACP is also supported under a care-based moral framework. I 
discuss this framework last for two reasons. First, it is one of the least popular 
ways of considering ethics and morality in medical practice.79 This is because 
questions of patient care are not orientated around the patient per se but are 
instead orientated around the relationships patients have with others.80 Second, 
the care approach is reasonably the framework that best matches the purpose 
and force behind ACP. 
A care approach to ethical or moral thinking is the idea that people 
sometimes do not make decisions by appealing to abstract principles, but 
instead they make decisions by appealing to the social context in which those 
decisions are made.81 Its central tenants are that people see themselves—and 
interact with others—via their relationship roles (e.g., parent, child, friend, 
relative, significant other), and that the relationships individuals have to one 
another are the basis of each person’s identity formation.82 Under this 
approach, not only do individuals have moral standing but so do their 
relationships.83 
Considering the purpose of ACP as well as some of the consequences of 
not having an advance care plan in times of need, how it fits within this 
framework becomes obvious. Medical providers have a professional 
responsibility to act in patients’ best interests as the individuals responsible for 
administering treatments.84 When treatment decisions align with patients’ 
known preferences, medical providers can feel confident they are correctly 
fulfilling their responsibility. However, providers may question whether they 
are correctly fulfilling their responsibility to act in a patient’s best interests 
when it is unclear whether treatment decisions align with what an incapacitated 
patient would truly want. Likewise, loved ones of incapacitated patients 
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typically believe it is their responsibility, by virtue of their relationships to 
those patients, to make treatment decisions that align with the patients’ values, 
goals, and preferences, and may believe they have failed to fulfill this 
responsibility if they are unsure whether treatment decisions truly reflect what 
those patients would have wanted. When decisions have to be made for 
incapacitated persons with unknown preferences, the relationships between 
providers and patients’ loved ones can also become strained as both parties 
may argue—while individually experiencing guilt or distress—over whether 
the “right” decisions were made. Loved ones may further experience anger and 
frustration toward patients for not previously articulating their treatment 
preferences. 
One of the primary values of ACP—perhaps the primary value—is that 
medical providers and health care agents know, or at least have a good sense 
of, what decisions to make for incapacitated patients. We know that even when 
treatment decisions result in a patient’s death, the patient’s loved ones 
experience less anxiety and depression when there is an ACP that helped guide 
the decision-making process.85 The reason is that the patients’ loved ones feel 
confident that they made decisions that best aligns with the patients’ known 
values, goals, and preferences.86 Providers, too, are likely apt to experience 
less distress if they know patients’ treatment preferences have been honored in 
practice. 
Robust ACP also reflects the care approach in the motives persons have for 
doing ACP. It is common during the ACP process for persons to orient their 
values, preferences, and choices for health care agents to their personal 
relationships. While some persons might appeal to their autonomous rights to 
make their preferences known to medical providers as their motivation for 
doing ACP, it has been the experience of this author that the reasons people 
most often give for why they do ACP center around wanting their loved ones 
to be aware of what matters the most to them and not wanting to burden loved 
ones with having to guess about what sorts of treatment decisions to make on 
their behalf. 
For Dr. Bernard Hammes, founder and director of the Respecting Choices 
program, the core of ACP is the reciprocal care that results from the planning 
process between the persons doing the planning and the surrogates—typically 
family members—who will be responsible for enacting the plan if needed.87 In 
a 2014 interview with CBS about the Respecting Choices program, Dr. 
Hammes noted that, “I think the ultimate topic that’s being discussed is how 
people care for each other. And so what comes out at the end of the 
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conversation is, ‘I love you, and I now know how to take good care of you.’”88 
In Dr. Hammes’ view, the purpose of ACP has less to do with ensuring basic 
principles of patient care and more to do with the relationships people have 
with their loved ones.89 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Work in the field of ACP provides empirical evidence that the standard of 
care is—or at least should be—shifting from basic to robust ACP. By not 
working to transition the standard of care from basic to robust ACP, health 
care organizations are providing what can reasonably be viewed as suboptimal 
care to patients. It is thusly argued in this paper that there is a moral obligation 
of health care organizations to develop robust ACP programs, primarily by 
showing the practical evidence of the success of robust ACP, while then 
showing how and why robust ACP fits within standard moral frameworks that 
guide ethical medical practice. 
There is, admittedly, a significant limitation of this argument, as I did not 
attempt to give an in-depth argument for why health care organizations should 
bear the responsibility of fulfilling this obligation as opposed to some other 
organization or entity. I only highlighted in the introduction why it is 
reasonable to assume that health care organizations should take on the work of 
developing ACP programs, but I did not carefully tie these reasons to the moral 
obligation to develop robust ACP programs for which I subsequently argued. 
Future work in this area should first attempt to develop stronger arguments for 
why health care organizations should be obliged to develop robust ACP 
programs. These arguments will likely need to come from either the realms of 
business ethics or organizational ethics, as opposed to medical ethics alone. 
The next step beyond establishing this moral obligation is to clearly 
identify the legal rights and risks of both following and failing to follow this 
obligation. For example, if we know that robust ACP improves outcomes 
related to patient and family experiences and is necessary toward ensuring the 
obligation of informed consent, would a failure of health care organizations to 
develop robust ACP programs be akin to medical negligence? And if so, how? 
What will help further support moral and legal arguments in favor of robust 
ACP is additional research that not only shows the impact of robust ACP on 
different aspects of patient care but also the impacts on providers and loved 
ones honoring advance care plans, with a particular focus on their long-term 
health outcomes as well. 
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